Abstract. The new …eld of judgment aggregation aims to …nd collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like "if a then b" are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic.
Introduction
In judgment aggregation, the objects of the group decision are not as usual (mutually exclusive) alternatives, but propositions representing interrelated (yes/no) questions the group faces. To ensure that these interrelations are well-de…ned, propositions are statements in a formal logic. As a simple example, suppose the three-member board of a central bank disagrees on which of the following propositions hold. a : GDP growth will pick up. b :
In ‡ation will pick up. a ! b : If GDP growth will pick up then in ‡ation will pick up.
Reaching collective beliefs is non-trivial. In Table 1 , each board member holds consistent (yes/no) beliefs but the propositionwise majority beliefs are inconsistent. To achieve consistent collective judgments, the group cannot use majority voting. What procedure should the group use instead? A wide-spread view is that, in this Table 1 : A simple judgment aggregation problem and three aggregation rules as in most other judgment aggregation problems, we must give up aggregating propositionwise 2 , for instance in favour of a premise-base rule (as discussed below). I show that this conclusion is often an artifact of an inappropriate way to model implications like a ! b. In many judgment aggregation problems, a more appropriate subjunctive interpretation of implications changes the logical relations between propositions in such a way that we can aggregate on a propositionwise basis without creating collective inconsistencies. Indeed, we can use quota rules: here, separate anonymous votes are taken on each proposition using (proposition-speci…c) acceptance thresholds. Suppose for instance that the following thresholds are used: b is accepted if and only if a majority accepts b, and a p 2 fa; a ! bg is accepted if and only if at least 3/4 of people accept p. Then, in the situation of Table 1 , a, a ! b and b are all rejected, i.e. the outcome is f:a; :(a ! b); :bg. The problem is that this outcome, although intuitively perfectly consistent, is declared inconsistent in classical logic, because classical logic de…nes :(a ! b) as equivalent to a^:b ("a and not-b"), by interpreting "!" as a material rather than a subjunctive implication. Is this equivalence plausible in our example? Intuitively, a^:b does indeed entail :(a ! b), but :(a ! b) does not entail a^:b because :(a ! b) does not intend to say anything about whether a and b are actually true or false: rather it intends to say that b would be false in the hypothetical (hence possibly counterfactual) case of a's truth. Indeed, a person who believes that it is false that a pick up in GDP growth leads to a pick up in in ‡ation may or may not believe that GDP growth or in ‡ation will actually pick up; what he believes is rather that in ‡ation will not pick up in the hypothetical case(s) that GDP growth will pick up.
In real-life judgment aggregation problems, implication statements usually have a subjunctive meaning. It is important not to misrepresent this meaning using material implications and classical logic, because this creates unnatural logical connections and arti…cial impossibilities of aggregation. The above quota rule, for instance, guarantees collective consistency (not just for the pro…le in Table 1 ) if the implication "a ! b" is subjunctive, but not if it is material. More generally, I establish the existence of quota rules with consistent outcomes for a large class of realistic agendas: the so-called implication agendas, which contain (bi-)implications and atomic propositions. This possibility is created by interpreting (bi-)implications subjunctively; it disappears if we instead use classical logic, i.e. interpret (bi-)implications materially. At …rst sight, this positive …nding seems in con ‡ict with the recent surge of impossibility results on propositionwise aggregation (see below). In fact, these results presuppose logical interconnections between propositions that are stronger than (or di¤erent to) those which I obtain here under the subjunctive interpretation of (bi-)implications. In various results, I derive the (necessary and su¢ cient) conditions that the acceptance thresholds of quota rules must satisfy in order to guarantee consistent outcomes. These results are applications of an abstract characterisation result, Theorem 3, which is valid for arbitrary agendas in a general logic. It also generalises the "intersection property" result by Nehring and Puppe [18, 19] (but not that by Dietrich and List [6] ).
Although I show that collective consistency is often achievable by aggregating propositionwise (using quota rules), I do not wish to generally advocate propositionwise aggregation. In particular, one may reject propositionwise aggregation rules by arguing that they neglect relevant information: in order to decide on b it is arguably not just relevant how people judge b but also why they do so, i.e. how they judge b's "premises" a and a ! b. This naturally leads to the popular premise-based rule: here, only a and a ! b -the "premises"-are decided through (majority) votes, while b -the "conclusion" -is accepted if and only if a and a ! b have been accepted; so that, in the situation of Table 1 , a and a ! b, and hence b, are accepted.
Despite the mentioned objection, propositionwise aggregation rules are superior from a manipulation angle: non-propositionwise aggregation rules can be manipulated by agenda setters (Dietrich [2] ) and by voters (Dietrich and List [5] ). 3 In general, the judgment aggregation problem -deciding which propositions to accept based on which ones the individuals accept -and its formal results are open to di¤erent interpretations of "accepting" and di¤erent sorts of propositions. This paper's examples and discussion focus on the case that "accepting" means "believing", 4 and mostly on the case that the propositions have a descriptive content (like "GDP growth will pick up"), although Section 4 touches on normative propositions (like "peace is better than war"). 5 In the literature, judgment aggregation is discussed on a less formal basis in law (e.g. Kornhauser and Sager [12] , Chapman [1] ) and political philosophy (e.g. Pettit [22] ), and is formalised in List and Pettit [15] who use classical propositional logic. Also the related belief merging literature in arti…cial intelligence uses classical propositional logic to represent propositions (e.g. Konieczny and Pino-Perez [11] and Pigozzi [23] ). A series of results establish, for di¤erent agendas, the impossibility of aggregating on a propositionwise basis in accordance with collective consistency and di¤erent other conditions (e.g. List and Pettit [15] , Pauly and van Hees [21] , Dietrich [2, 4] , Gärdenfors [10] , Nehring and Puppe [20] , van Hees [26] , Dietrich and List [7] , Dokow and Holzman [9] and Mongin [17] ). Further impossibilities (with minimal 3 Consider for instance premise-based voting in Table 1 . The agenda setter may reverse the outcome on b by replacing the premises a and a ! b by other premises a 0 and a 0 ! b. Voter 2 or 3 can reverse the outcome on b by pretending to reject both premises a and a ! b. 4 Judgment aggregation is the aggregation of belief sets if "accepting" means "believing", the aggregation of desire sets if "accepting" means "desiring", the aggregation of moral judgment sets if "accepting" means "considering as morally good", etc. 5 By considering beliefs on possibly normative propositions, judgment aggregation uses a broader "belief" notion than is common in economics, where beliefs usually apply to descriptive facts only. For instance, standard preference aggregation problems can be modelled as judgment aggregation problems by interpreting preferences as beliefs of normative propositions like "x is better than y" (see Dietrich and List [7] ; also List and Pettit [16] ). agenda conditions) follow from Nehring and Puppe's [18, 19] results on strategyproof social choice. To achieve possibility, propositionwise aggregation is given up in favour of distance-based aggregation by Pigozzi [23] (drawing on Konieczny and Pino-Perez [11] ), of sequential aggregation by List [14] and Dietrich and List [6] , and of aggregating relevant information by Dietrich [4] .
Section 7 uses Dietrich's [3] judgment aggregation model in general logics, and the other sections use for the …rst time possible-worlds semantics.
De…nitions
We consider a group or persons N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng (n 2), who need collective judgments on a set of propositions expressed in formal logic.
The language. Following Dietrich's [3] general logics model, a language is given by a non-empty set L of sentences (called propositions) closed under negation, i.e. p 2 L implies :p 2 L. (Interesting languages of course have also other connectives than negation :). Logical interconnections are captured either by an entailment relation (telling for which A L and p 2 L we have A p) or, equivalently, by a consistency notion (telling which sets A L are consistent). 6 The two notions are interde…nable: a set A L is inconsistent if and only A p and A :p for some p 2 L; and an entailment A p holds if and only if A [ f:pg is inconsistent. 7 The precise nature of logical interconnections is addressed later. A proposition p 2 L is a contradiction if fpg is inconsistent, and a tautology if f:pg is inconsistent.
All following sections except Section 7 consider a particular language: L is the set of propositions constructible using : ("not"),^("and") and ! ("if-then") from a set A 6 = ; of non-decomposable symbols, called atomic propositions (and representing simple statements like "in ‡ation will pick up"). So L is the smallest set such that (i) A L and (ii) p; q 2 L implies :p 2 L, (p^q) 2 L and (p ! q) 2 L. The critical question, treated in the next section, is how (not) to de…ne the logical interconnections on L: while some entailments like a; b a^b and a; a ! b b are not controversial, others are. Notationally, I drop brackets when there is no ambiguity, e.g. c ! (a^b) stands for (c ! (a^b)). Further, p _ q ("p or q") stands for :(:p^:q), and p $ q ("p if and only if q") stands for (p ! q)^(q ! p). For any conjunction p = a 1^: ::^a k of one or more atomic propositions a 1 ; :::; a k (called the conjuncts of p), let C(p) := fa 1 ; :::; a k g (e.g. C(a) = fag and C(a^b) = C(b^a) = fa; bg).
In judgment aggregation, the term "connection rule" commonly refers to implicational statements like "if GDP growth continues and interest rates stay below X then in ‡ation will rise". I now formalise this terminology. If each of p and q is a conjunction of one or more atomic propositions, 6 For the two approaches, see Dietrich [3] . Logical interconnections can be interpreted either semantically or syntactically (in the latter case, the symbol "`" is more common than " "). In the (classical or non-classical) logics considered in Sections 3-6, I de…ne interconnections semantically (but there are equivalent syntactic de…nitions). Dropping brackets, I often write p1; :::; p k p for fp1; :::; p k g p. 7 The latter equivalence supposes that the logic is not paraconsistent. All logics considered in this paper are of this kind.
p ! q is a uni-directional connection rule, called non-degenerate if C(q)nC (p) 6 = ;, i.e. if p ! q is not a tautology (under the classical or the non-classical entailment relation discussed later); p $ q is a bi-directional connection rule, called non-degenerate if C(q)nC(p) 6 = ; and C(p)nC(q) 6 = ;, i.e. if neither p ! q nor q ! p is a tautology.
A uni-or bi-directional connection rule is simply called a connection rule.
The agenda. The agenda is the set of propositions on which decisions are needed. Formally, it is a non-empty set X L of the form X = fp; :p : p 2 X + g for some set X + containing no negated proposition :q. In the introductory example, X + = fa; b; a ! bg. Notationally, double-negations cancel each other out: if p 2 X is a negated proposition :q then hereafter when I write ":p" I mean q rather than ::q. (This ensures that :p 2 X.)
An agendaX (in the language L just de…ned) is an implication agenda if X + consists of non-degenerate connection rules and the atomic propositions occurring in them; it is called simple if all its connection rules are uni-directional ones p ! q in which p and q are atomic propositions.
Many standard examples of judgment aggregation problems can be modelled with implication agendas. The atomic propositions represent (controversial) issues, and connection rules represent (controversial) links between issues. Any accepted connection rule establishes a constraint on how to decide the issues. Implication agendas can always be represented graphically as networks over its atomic propositions. 8 Figure 1 shows seven implication agendas, of which (1) and (5)- (7) are simple. Agenda (1) represents our central bank example. An environmental expert commission might face the agenda (2), where a is "global warming will continue"and b is "the ozone hole exceeds size X". The judges of a legal court face, in the decision problem from which judgment aggregation originated, an agenda of type (3), where a is "the defendant has broken the contract", b is "the contract is legally valid", c is "the defendant is liable", and c $ (a^b) is a claim on what constitutes (necessary and su¢ cient) conditions of liability. 9 A company board trying to predict the price policy of three rival …rms A-C might face the agenda (3) or (4) or (7), where a is "Firm A will raise prices", b is "Firm B will raise prices", and c is "Firm C will raise prices". The three agendas di¤er in the type of connections between a; b; c deemed possible.
In Section 4, I discuss two types of decision problems captured by implication agendas: reaching judgments on facts and their causal relations, and reaching judgments on hypotheses and their justi…cational/evidential relations.
But not all realistic judgment aggregation problems are formalisable by implication agendas. Some judgment aggregation problems involve a generalised kind of implication agenda, obtained by generalising the de…nition of connection rules so as to include (bi-)implications between propositions p and q other than conjunctions of atomic propositions. 10 More radical departures from implication agendas include: (i) the agenda given by X + = fa; b; a^bg, which contains no connection rule but the Boolean expression a^b; (ii) the agenda representing a preference aggregation problem, which contains propositions of the form xRy from a predicate logic (see Section 7); (iii) agendas where X + contains only atomic propositions, between which certain connection rules are imposed exogenously (rather than subjected to a decision).
Judgment sets. A judgment set (held by a person or the group) is a subset A X; p 2 A stands for "the person/group accepts proposition p". A judgment set A can be more or less rational. Ideally, it should be both complete, i.e. contain at least one member of each pair p; :p 2 X, and (logically) consistent. A is weakly consistent if A does not contain a pair p; :p 2 X (i.e., intuitively, if A is not "obviously inconsistent"). For agenda (1) in Figure 1 , fa; a ! b; :bg is complete, weakly consistent, but not consistent because A entails b (in fact, fa; a ! bg entails b) and A entails :b (in fact, contains :b). So to say, "weak consistency" means not to contain a contradiction p; :p, and consistency means not to entail one.
Aggregation rules.
A pro…le is an n-tuple (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) of (individual) judgment sets A i X. A (judgment) aggregation rule is a function F that maps each pro…le (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) from a given domain of pro…les to a (group) judgment set F (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) = A X. The domain of F is universal if it consists of all pro…les of complete and consistent judgment sets. F is complete/consistent/weakly consistent if F generates a complete/consistent/weakly consistent judgment set for each pro…le in 9 A doctrinal paradox arises if there is a majority for a, a majority for b, a unanimity for c $ (a^b), but a majorty for :c.
1 0 If, for instance, p and q were allowed to be disjunctions of atomic propositions then a ! (b _ c) would count as a connection rule, so that X + = fa; b; c; (a _ b) ! cg would de…ne an implication agenda of the so-generalised kind. Generalised implication agendas may well be relevant as groups may need to make up their mind on generalised types of connection rules. The possibility of consistent aggregation by quota rules may disappear for such agendas. So our subjunctive reading of (bi-)implications (see Section 3) is not a general recipe for possibility in judgment aggregation. its domain. On the universal domain, majority rule (given by F (A 1 ; :::; A n ) = fp 2 X : more persons i have p 2 A i than p = 2 A i g) is weakly consistent, and a dictatorial rule (given by F (A 1 ; :::; A n ) = A j for a …xed j) is even consistent. We will focus on quota rules thus de…ned. To each family (m p ) p2X + of numbers in f1; :::; ng, the quota rule with thresholds (m p ) p2X + is the aggregation rule with universal domain given by F (mp) p2X + (A 1 ; :::; A n ) = fp 2 X : at least m p persons i have p 2 A i g, where m :p := n m p + 1 for all p 2 X + to ensure exactly one member of each pair p; :p 2 X is accepted, i.e. that quota rules are complete and weakly consistent.
So each family of thresholds (m p ) p2X + in f1; :::; ng generates a quota rule. As one easily checks, an aggregation rule is a quota rule if and only if it has universal domain and is complete, weakly consistent, independent, anonymous, monotonic, and responsive. 11 The important property missing here is consistency. We will investigate if and how the thresholds can be chosen so as to achieve consistency. The properties of independence and monotonicity are equivalent to strategy-proofness if each individual i holds epistemic preferences, i.e. would like the group to hold beliefs close to A i , the set of propositions i considers true. 12 
A non-classical logic
How should we de…ne the logical interconnections within the language L speci…ed in Section 2? Although classical logic gets some entailments right (like a; a ! b b), its treatment of connection rules is inappropriate, or so I will argue.
Requirements on the representation of connection rules. To re ‡ect the intended meaning of connection rules such as a ! b; c $ a; a ! (b^c), the logic should respect the following conditions.
(a) The acceptance of a connection rule r establishes exactly the intended logical constraints on atomic propositions, i.e. r is consistent with the "right" sets of atomic and negated atomic propositions. For instance, a ! b is inconsistent with fa; :bg but consistent with each of fa; bg; f:a; bg; f:a; :bg. 1 1 Independence: for all p 2 X and all admissible pro…les (A1; :::; An); (A 1 ; :::; A n ), if fi : p 2 Aig = fi : p 2 A i ) then p 2 F (A1; :::; An) , p 2 F (A 1 ; :::; A n ). Anonymity : F (A1; :::; An) = F (A (1) ; :::; A (n) ) for all admissible pro…les (A1; :::; An), (A (1) ; :::; A (n) ), where : N 7 ! N is any permutation. Monotonicity : for all individuals i and admissible pro…les (A1; :::; An); (A1; :::; A i ; :::; An) di¤ering only in i's judgment set, if F (A1; :::; An) = A i then F (A1; :::; A i ; :::; An) = A i . Responsiveness: for all p 2 X (such that neither p nor :p is a tautology) there are admissible pro…les (A1; :::; An), (A 1 ; :::; A n ) with p 2 F (A1; :::; An) and p = 2 F (A 1 ; :::; A n ). Clearly, quota rules satisfy all seven axioms. Conversely, independence and anonymity imply that the group judgment on any given p 2 X depends only on the number np := jfi : p 2 Aigj. This dependence is positive by monotonicity, hence described by an acceptance threshold mp 2 f0; 1; :::; n + 1g. If p and :p are not tautologies, mp is by responsiveness not 0 and not n + 1, i.e. mp 2 f1; :::; ng; and m:p = n mp + 1 by completeness and weak consistency. If p or :p is a tautology, we may assume w.l.o.g. that, again, mp 2 f1; :::; ng and m:p = n mp + 1. 1 2 That is, i weakly prefers the group to hold judgment set A over judgment set B if for all p 2 X on which Ai agrees with B, Ai also agrees with A. This condition only partly …xes i's preferences, but it for instance implies that i most prefers i's own judgment set Ai. See Dietrich and List [5] .
(b) The negation of a (non-degenerate) connection rule r does not constrain atomic propositions, i.e. :r is consistent with each (consistent) set of atomic and negated atomic propositions. For instance, :(a ! b) is consistent with each of fa; bg, fa; :bg; f:a; bg; f:a; :bg.
To illustrate (b), consider again the central bank example, where a is "GDP growth will pick up"and b is "in ‡ation will pick up". Consider a board member who believes that :(a ! b), i.e. that rising GDP does not imply rising in ‡ation. This belief is intuitively perfectly consistent with any beliefs on a and b, i.e. on whether GDP will grow and whether in ‡ation will rise. It is well-known that the material interpretation misrepresents the intended meaning of most conditional statements in common language. The (in common language clearly false) statement "if the sun stops shining then we burn" is true materially because the sun does not stop shining. The material interpretation clashes with intuition because, in common language, "if a then b"is not a statement about the actual world, but about whether b holds in hypothetical world(s) where a holds, e.g. worlds where the sun stops shining. "If a then b"thus means "if a were true ceteris paribus, then b would be true", not "a is false or b is true".
A conditional logic. A subjunctive reading of "!", where the truth value of a ! b depends on b's truth value in possibly non-actual worlds, has been formalised using possible-worlds semantics, and more speci…cally using conditional logic which originated from Stalnaker [25] and D. Lewis [13] and is now well-established in nonclassical logic. I use a standard version of conditional logic, sometimes denoted C + (other versions could also be used). For further reference, e.g. Priest [24] .
For comparison, recall that in classical logic (not in C + ) A L entails p 2 L if and only if every classical interpretation that makes all q 2 A true makes p true, where a classical interpretation is simply a ("truth") function v : L ! fT; F g that assigns to each proposition a truth value such that, for all p; q 2 L,
This leads to counter-intuitive entailments like :a a ! b and b a ! b, the so-called paradoxes of material implication. In response, the notion of an "interpretation" must be rede…ned. A C + -interpretation consists of a non-empty set W of (possible) worlds w;
for every proposition p 2 L a function f p : W ! P(W ) (f p (w) contains the worlds to which "if p were true" refers, i.e. the worlds "similar" to w and with true p); for every world w 2 W a ("truth") function v w : L ! fT; F g (that tells what propositions hold in w). 
e. p holds in the worlds to which "if p were true" refers), if v w (p) = T then w 2 f p (w) (i.e. if p already holds in w then "if p were true" refers to w).
The truth condition for p ! q (third bullet point) captures the intuitive meaning of implications. "If the sun stops shining then we burn" is false in our world: we do not burn in worlds similar to ours but without the sun shining.
By de…nition,
) and all worlds w 2 W , if all q 2 A hold in w then p holds in w (i.e. p holds "whenever" all q 2 A hold). For instance, a; b; (a^b) ! c c; but :a 2 a ! b and b 2 a ! b (so C + does not su¤er the paradoxes of material implication). Recall that A L is consistent if and only if there is no p 2 L with A p and A :p. So A is (C + -)consistent if and only if there is an interpretation (W; (f p ); (v w )) and a world w 2 W in which all q 2 A hold (i.e. all q 2 A "can"hold simultaneously). So fa; :ag is inconsistent: if a holds in a word w, :a is false in w. And fa; :(a ! b); bg is consistent (but classically inconsistent): let a and b both hold in w and let f a (w) contain a world w 0 in which b is false. 13 1 3 This is an example of why C + meets our requirement (b) on the treatment of connection rules. To verify (b) in general, apply Lemma 8 to sets A consisting of negated non-degenerate connection rules and of atomic or negated atomic propositions (and note that (20) does not hold since A\R = ;).
Simple implication agendas
Given the logic C + , which quota rules are consistent? I …rst give an answer for simple implication agendas.
Theorem 1 A quota rule F (mp) p2X + for a simple implication agenda X is consistent if and only if
So consistent quota rules do exist: putting m p = n for all p 2 X + validates (1). But this extreme quota rule is far from the only consistent quota rule; for instance, (1) holds if all atomic propositions a 2 X get the same threshold m a (so all issues are treated symmetrically) and all connection rules a ! b 2 X get the unanimity threshold m a!b = n (so links between issues are very hard to accept).
Some consequences of (1) can be expressed in terms of the network structure of the (simple) implication agenda X (see Figure The picture changes radically if we misrepresent the decision problem by using classical logic: then there exists at most one and typically no consistent quota rule F (mp) p2X + , where "consistent" now means classically consistent and the (universal) domain of F (mp) p2X + now consists of the pro…les of complete and classically consistent judgment sets. 14 More precisely, the classical counterpart of Theorem 1 is the following result.
Theorem 1* De…ning logical interconnections using classical logic, a quota rule F (mp) p2X + for a simple implication agenda X is consistent if and only if
So there is no classically consistent quota rule if X contains a "chain"a ! b; b ! c; and there is a single (unnatural) one otherwise.
Each of the two theorems can be proven in two steps: step 1 identi…es possible types/sources of inconsistency, and step 2 shows that (1) (respectively, (2)) is necessary and su¢ cient to prevent these types of inconsistency.
More precisely, Theorem 1 follows from the following two lemmas (steps) by noting that any collective judgment set A X generated by a quota rule satis…es:
A contains exactly one member of each pair p; :p 2 X.
1 4 Within a simple implication agenda X, the classical logical interconnections are stronger than the C + ones: all classically consistent sets A X are C + -consistent but not vice versa (see Lemmas 1, 2) . So a consistent quoto rule's (universal) domain and co-domain shrink by moving to classical logic.
Lemma 1 For a simple implication agenda X, a set A X satisfying (3) is consistent if and only if it contains no triple a; a ! b; :b 2 X.
Lemma 2 For a simple implication agenda X, a quota rule F (mp) p2X + never accepts any triple a; a ! b; :b 2 X if and only if (1) holds. 15 Analogously, Theorem 1* follows from the following two lemmas (steps).
Lemma 1* For a simple implication agenda X, a set A X satisfying (3) Lemmas 1 and 1* highlight the di¤erence between non-classical and classical logic: the latter creates two additional types of inconsistency (in simple implication agendas). These additional inconsistencies are arti…cial; e.g. b is intuitively consistent with :(a ! b). By Lemma 2, (1) is necessary and su¢ cient to exclude all non-classical inconsistencies a; a ! b; :b 2 X. But (1) does nothing to prevent the arti…cial classical inconsistencies. 16 To prevent also these, (1) must be strengthened to (2) by Lemma 2*.
I …rst prove Lemmas 1 and 1*, in reverse order to start simple. Proof of Lemma 1. Let X and A X be as speci…ed. If A X contains a triple a; a ! b; :b, A is of course (C + -)inconsistent. Now assume A contains no triple a; a ! b; :b. To show that A is consistent (though perhaps classically inconsistent), I specify a C + -interpretation (W; (f p ); (v w )) with a world w 2 W in which all p 2 A hold. Let W contain:
(a) a world w, in which an atomic proposition a holds if and only if a 2 A; (b) for every atomic proposition a, a world w a (6 = w) such that
2 A and f a ( w) = f w; w a g if a 2 A (so "if a were true" refers to w a , and as required by the notion of a C + -interpretation also to the actual world w if a holds there, i.e. if a 2 A); in w a exactly those atomic propositions b are false for which :(a ! b) 2 A.
We have to convince ourselves that all p 2 A hold in w. All atomic or negated atomic p 2 A hold in w by (a). Also any negated implication :(a ! b) 2 A holds in w: by (b), "if a were true" refers to w a , in which b is false; whence in w a ! b is false, i.e. :(a ! b) true. Finally, suppose a ! b 2 A. I have to show that b holds in all worlds w 2 f a ( w). There are two cases.
Case 2 : a = 2 A. Then f a ( w) = fw a g; and b holds in w a , as just mentioned.
I now show Lemmas 2 and 2*, completing the proof of Theorems 1 and 1*.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let F (mp) p2X + be a quota rule for a simple implication agenda X. Take a given triple a; a ! b; :b 2 X. I consider all pro…les for which a and a ! b are collectively accepted, and I show that b is collectively accepted (i.e. :b rejected) for all such pro…les if and only if m b m a + m a!b n.
Note …rst that in all such pro…les at least m a people accept a and at least m a!b people accept a ! b; hence the number of people accepting both these propositions (hence also b) is at least m a + m a!b n (in fact, at least maxfm a + m a!b n; 0g). Thus, if m b m a + m a!b n, b is in all such pro…les accepted by at least m b people, hence collectively accepted.
For the converse, note that among such pro…les there is one such that exactly maxfm a + m a!b n; 0g people accept both a and a ! b (hence b) and such that no one else accepts b. If m b > m a + m a!b n, then in this pro…le less than m b people accept b, so that b is collectively rejected.
Proof of Lemma 2*. Let F (mp) p2X + be a quota rule for a simple implication agenda X, with the classical logical interconnections. Lemma 2 (and its proof) also holds under classical logic; so F (mp) p2X + never accepts any triple a; a ! b; :b 2 X if and only if (1) Together these inequalities are equivalent to the condition in (2), as is easily checked.
Constructing consistent quota rules. I now discuss how to choose thresholds (m p ) p2X + that satisfy (1), for a simple implication agenda X. The notions of a child/parent and a descendant/ancestor are de…ned above. A path is a sequence (a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a k ) in X (k 2) in which each a j is a parent of a j+1 (j < k). X is acyclic if it has no cycle, i.e. no path (a 1 ; :::; a k ) with a 1 = a k . The depth of X is d X := supfk : there is a path in X of length kg, and the level of an atomic proposition a 2 X is l a := supfk : there is a path in X of length k ending with ag, interpreted as 1 if no path ends with a. So a 2 X has level 1 if it has no parents, level 2 if it has parents all of which have level 1, etc. Figure 3 shows an acyclic simple implication agenda with three levels. How free are we in choosing the thresholds (m p ) p2X + ? Clearly, by (1) the thresholds of atomic propositions must weakly decrease along any path. If X is acyclic and …nite (hence of …nite depth d X ), (m p ) p2X + can be chosen recursively in the following d X steps.
Step l ( 
But this procedure may involve choosing many thresholds: in Figure 3 , those of 13 atomic propositions and 13 implications! To reduce complexity, one might use the same threshold m = m a!b for all connection rules a ! b 2 X, where m re ‡ects how easily the group imposes constraints between issues, the same threshold m l for all propositions in X with the same level l (2 f1; :::; d X g), where m l re ‡ects how easily the group accepts level l propositions. 
Consistent quota rules of type F m;m 1 ;:::;m d K can be constructed as follows.
Step 0: choose m 2 f1; :::; ng such that (i) m n (n 1)=(d X 1).
Step l (= 1; 2; :::; d X ): choose m l 2 f1; :::; ng such that (ii)
The conditions (i)-(iii) follow from Corollary 1: (iii) is obvious, and (i) and (ii) make the choices in future steps possible. 17 For a group of size n = 10 and the agenda of Figure 3 , a consistent quota rule F m;m 1 ;m 2 ;m 3 might be chosen as follows.
Step 0: m = 8 (note that 8 n (n 1)=(d X 1) = 10 9=2 = 5:5).
Step 1: m 1 = 8 (note that 8 1 + (d X 1)(n m) = 1 + 2 2 = 5).
Step 2: m 2 = 6 (note that 6 1+(d X 2)(n m) = 1+2 = 3 and 6 m 1 +m n = 8 + 8 10 = 6).
Step 3: m 3 = 4 (note that 4 1 + (d X 3)(n m) = 1 and 4 m 2 + m n = 6 + 8 10 = 4).
Causal and justi…cational interpretation. I now o¤er two interpretations of connection rules, and hence of the kind of decision problems captured by implication agendas. For simplicity, I restrict myself to a simple implication agendas X.
First, suppose implications a ! b 2 X have a causal status: a ! b means that fact a causes fact b. So X might contain "if the ozone hole has size X then global warming will continue" and "if global warming will continue then species Y will die out". Then X captures a decision problem of forming beliefs about facts and their causal links. A path (a 1 ; :::; a k ) in X is a causal chain (assuming the causal links a 1 ! a 2 ; :::; a k 1 ! a k hold), and the level of a proposition indicates how "causally fundamental" it is. By an earlier remark, Theorem 1 implies that the acceptance threshold must weakly decrease along any causal chain.
Second, suppose the implications a ! b 2 X have a justi…cational (or evidential or indicative) status: a ! b means that a indicates b (a can indicate b without causing b: a wet street indicates rain without causing it). So X captures a decision problem of forming beliefs about claims/statements/hypotheses and their justi…cational links. Some claims may have a normative content, like "a multi-cultural society is desirable" or "option x is better than option y". For instance, an environmental panel might decide on a : "the ozone hole has size larger than X", b : "tax T on kerosine should be introduced", and the justi…cational link a ! b. A path (a 1 ; :::; a k ) is an "argumentative"chain (assuming the links a 1 ! a 2 ; :::; a k 1 ! a k hold), and the level of a proposition re ‡ects how "argumentatively fundamental" it is. Often, high level propositions are more concrete and might state that certain collective acts should be taken (a road should be built, a …rm downsized, a law amended, etc.), whereas their ancestors describe potential reasons or arguments, either of a descriptive kind (tra¢ c will increase, demand will fall, etc.) or of a normative kind (multi-culturalism is desirable, etc.). Of course, one may reject a reason a 2 X, or reject a's status as reason for b 2 X (i.e. reject a ! b). Again, reasons need at least as high acceptance thresholds as their (argumentative) descendents, e.g. 
Other special implication agendas
The di¤erence between using non-classical and using classical logic is now further illustrated by considering two other types of implication agendas X, namely semi-simple ones: here all connection rules in X are implications p ! b in which b is atomic (such as (a^c) ! b but not a ! (b^c)); bi-simple ones: here all connection rules in X are bi-implications a $ b in which a and b are atomic.
For each of these agenda types, we again perform two steps (analogous to the steps performed for simple implication agendas):
(step 1) we identify possible types/sources of inconsistency in the agenda; (step 2) we exclude each one by an inequality on thresholds and if possible we simplify the system of inequalities.
This gives a consistency condition for quota rules F (mp) p2X + , in analogy to Theorem 1. Again, using instead classical logic leads in step 1 to additional (arti…cial) types of inconsistency; so that, in analogy to Theorem 1*, at most one (degenerate) quota rule F (mp) p2X + is classically consistent (if X is semi-simple), or even no one (if X is bi-simple). (3) is consistent i¤ it has no subset of type(s)... Table 2 : Three types of implication agendas X, their types of inconsistencies, and their consistent quota rules; in non-classical logic and in classical logic ("CL")
In Table 2 , the results for simple X were shown in the last section. Regarding semi-or bi-simple X, we have to adapt Lemmas 1 and 2 (or 1* and 2* for classical logic). Let me brie ‡y indicate how this works. First a general remark. The types of inconsistency in step 1 can be (and are in Table 2 ) identi…ed with certain inconsistent sets Y X (which are minimal inconsistent, in fact irreducible; see Section 7); and the inequality needed in step 2 to exclude Y 's acceptance can always be written as
(see Lemma 5 in Section 7). Intuitively, (6) requires the propositions in Y to have su¢ ciently high acceptance thresholds to prevent joint acceptance of all p 2 Y . First let X be semi-simple. In step 1 we have to consider not only inconsistent sets of type fa; a ! b; :bg X (as for simple X) but also ones like fa; c; (a^c) ! b; :bg X. By adapting Lemma 1 to semi-simple agendas, the inconsistent sets in step 1 turn out to be precisely the sets C(p) [ fp ! b; :bg X. In the proof of Lemma 1, the C + -interpretation (W; (f p ); (v w )) should be adapted by letting W contain:
(a) a world w, in which an atomic proposition a holds i¤ a 2 A (as before) (b) for any conjunction p of atomic propositions a world w p (6 = w) such that f p ( w) = fw p g if C(p) 6 A and f p ( w) = f w; w p g if C(p) A (so "if p were true" refers to world w p , and also to the actual world w if p holds there); in w p exactly those atomic propositions b are false for which :(p ! b) 2 A.
The rest of Lemma 1 -showing that all p 2 A hold in w -is easily adapted. Using (6), it then follows that a quota rule F (mp)
Note that this characterisation indeed reduces to Theorem 1 if X is simple. By contrast, classical logic leads in step 1 to new inconsistent sets of type fb; :(p !
Again, this characterisation reduces to Theorem 1* if X is simple. Now let X be bi-simple. In step 1, the sets of type fa; :b; a $ bg or f:a; b; a $ bg or fa $ b; :(b $ agg capture all types of (non-classical) inconsistency. This can be shown by again adapting Lemma 1 and its proof; when de…ning the C + -interpretation (W; (f p ); (v w )), we simply have to replace the second bullet point of (b) by:
in the world w a (to which "if a were true"refers), exactly those atomic propositions b are false for which :(a $ b) 2 A or :(b $ a) 2 A.
By adapting Lemma 2 and its proof (or by using (6) and that m :q = n m q + 1 for all q 2 X), a quota rule 
So all bi-implications need the unanimity threshold, and two atomic propositions ("issues") need the same threshold if they are linked by a bi-implication in X or, more generally, by a path of bi-implications in X. Transforming implication agendas into semi-simple ones. Semi-simple implication agendas are of special interest. While they exclude from the agenda many connection rules -all uni-directional ones with non-atomic consequent and all bidirectional ones -each connection rule of the excluded type can be rewritten, in logically equivalent terms, as a conjunction of connection rules of the non-excluded type p ! b with atomic b: indeed, each uni-directional connection rule p ! q is equivalent to the conjunction^b 2C(q)nC(p) (p ! b), and each bi-directional connection rule p $ q is equivalent to the conjunction ^b 2C(q)nC(p) (p ! b) ^ ^b 2C(p)nC(q) (q ! b) . So every implication agenda X can be transformed into a semi-simple oneX by replacing every "non-allowed" connection rule r 2 X + by all the "allowed" ones p ! b of which r is a conjunction (up to logical equivalence). For instance, the implication agenda X given by X + = fa; b; c; c $ (a^b)g, which models the judges' decision problem in a law suit (see Section 2), can be transformed into the semi-simple implication agendaX given byX + = fa; b; c; c ! a; c ! b; (a^b) ! cg; underX, the judges decide not en bloc on c $ (a^b), but separately on whether liability of the defendant implies breach of the contract, whether liability implies validity of the contract, and whether breach of a valid contract implies liability.
Should we conclude from this that all collective decision problems describable by an implication agenda X, like the mentioned one of judges in a law suit, can be remodelled using the corresponding semi-simple implication agendaX? And that we could therefore restrict ourselves to the semi-simple case? Not quite, because the change of agenda alters the decision problem. More precisely, it re…nes (i.e. augments) the decision problem: indeed, from any (complete and consistent) judgment set forX we can always derive a unique one for X, but not vice versa. In the example just given, the judgments on the "new" connection rules c ! a; c ! b; (a^b) ! c 2X together imply a judgment on the "old" one c $ (a^b) 2 X, but not vice versa because if c $ (a^b) is negated we do not know which one(s) of c ! a; c ! b; (a^b) ! c to negate (we only know that at least one of them must be negated). In summary, it is true that the decision problem described by X can be settled by moving to the semisimple agendaX, but one thereby settles more and one uses richer in-and output information in the aggregation.
General implication agendas
Many implication agendas are of neither of the kinds analysed so far, because they contain connection rules like a ! (b^c) or (a^b) $ (a^c). Which quota rules are consistent for general implication agendas (in the non-classical logic C + )? In principle, the above two-step procedure applies again. But, for an agenda class as rich as this one, a so far neglected question becomes pressing: what is it that makes an inconsistent set Y X a "type of inconsistency" (in step 1)? Why for instance did we count sets fa; a ! b; :bg X but not sets fa; a ! b; b ! c; :cg X as types of inconsistency for simple implication agendas X? Surely, the set Y of all types of inconsistency Y X must, to enable step 1, be chosen such that every inconsistent set A X satisfying ( 3) has a subset in Y.
But usually many choices of Y satisfy (10) . Intuitively, it is useful to choose Y small and simple. An always possible -but often unduly large -choice of Y is to include in Y all minimal inconsistent sets Y X. 18 For simple implication agendas X, we chose Y = ffa; a ! b; :bg : a ! b 2 Xg, although we could have also included minimal inconsistent sets of type fa; a ! b; b ! c; :cg X. We were able to exclude such sets (and still satisfy (10)) because such sets are reducible in the following sense. For a set A X satisfying (3), if A fa; a ! b; b ! c; :cg then, as A contains b or :b, either A fb; b ! c; :cg or A fa; a ! b; :bg, whence A has a subset in Y.
In Section 7, a general method to choose Y is developed, based on a formalisation of what it means to "reduce" an inconsistent set to a simpler one; Y then contains irreducible sets. Applied to implication agendas, the method yields two kinds of irreducible sets, i.e. two types of inconsistency (as shown in the appendix 19 ):
(Ir + ) sets representing an inconsistency between a non-negated connection rule and atomic or negated atomic propositions, like fa ! (b^c); a; :bg or fa $ b; :a; bg; (Ir ) sets representing an inconsistency between a negated connection rule and nonnegated connection rules, like f:(a ! (b^c)); a ! b; a ! cg or f:(a ! (b^c^d)); a ! (b^c); a $ dg.
In step 2, these irreducible sets yield a system of inequalities whose successive simpli…cation gives the characterisation of Theorem 2 below. This characterisation involves, for every p ! q 2 X, a particular set X p!q . This set is de…ned in two steps. First, we form the set
of all propositions "reachable" from p via (bi-)implications in X. From X p we then form the set X p!q := fS X p : S is minimal subject to C(q)nC(p) [ s2S C(s)g of all sets S X p that have, and are minimal subject to, this property: each atomic proposition "in" q (but not "in" p) is "in" some s 2 S. So the sets S 2 X p!q minimally "cover" C(q)nC(p).
Evaluating X p and X p!q is purely mechanical. As a …rst example, suppose
Here all three implications have antecedent a, where X a = fb; c; b^cg. From X a we then derive X a!b ; X a!c and X a!(b^c) . For instance, X a!b contains fbg X a and fb^cg X a as both minimally "cover"b, but contains neither fcg X a (which fails to "cover" b), nor fb; cg X a (which "covers" b non-minimally as we can remove c), nor any other set S X a . Further, X a!(b^c) does not contain fc; b^cg X a : although this set "covers" b^c (as all atomic propositions "in" b^c are "in" some s 2 fc; b^cg), it does so non-minimally (as c can be removed); but X a!(b^c) contains fb; cg and fb^cg (which "cover" b^c minimally). In summary, X a!b = ffbg; fb^cgg; X a!c = ffcg; fb^cgg; X a!(b^c) = ffb; cg; fb^cgg. (12) 1 8 Y is minimal inconsistent if Y is inconsistent but its proper subsets are consistent. 1 9 In fact, each type has two subtypes, one for uni-and one for bi-directional connection rules.
As a second example, suppose
The two implications, a ! b and a ! (b^c), both have antecedent a, where X a = fb; c; b^cg. From X a we then derive that:
X a!b = ffbg; fb^cgg, X a!(b^c) = ffb; cg; fb^cgg.
Sets X p!q appear in Theorem 2 because they are needed to describe inconsistencies of type (Ir ). Let me give an intuition for why the sets X p!q relate to inconsistencies of type (Ir ) (details are in the appendix). For the agenda (11), Y = f:(a ! (b^c)); a ! b; a ! cg is an inconsistency of type (Ir ). Y is inconsistent precisely because the conjuncts of a^b are "covered" by the set of consequents of a ! b; a ! c 2 Y , i.e. by fb; cg; in fact, they are so minimally: fb; cg 2 X a!(b^c) . Another agenda X might have the inconsistency of type (Ir ) f:(a ! (b^c^d)); a ! (b^c); a $ dg. This set is inconsistent precisely because the conjuncts of b^c^d are "covered" by the set of consequents fb^c; dg; they are so minimally: fb^c; dg 2 X a!(b^c^d) .
I now state the characterisation result (formally proven in the appendix). As usual, A B denotes the symmetric di¤erence (AnB) [ (BnA) of sets A and B.
Theorem 2 A quota rule F (mp) p2X + for an implication agenda X is consistent if and only if the thresholds satisfy the following:
(a) for every p ! q 2 X, X
(n m p!s );
, and (iii) m a is the same for all a 2 C(p) C(q) and equals n if jC(p) C(q)j 3.
Theorem 2 characterises consistent quota rules by complicated (in)equalities. A rough interpretation is:
inconsistencies of type (Ir + ) are prevented by the LHS inequalities of (a) and by (b); given the LHS inequalities of (a) and (b), inconsistencies of type (Ir ) are prevented by the RHS inequalities in (a).
More detailed clues to understand the conditions (a) and (b) are given at the section end, drawing on the insights gained above on the simple, semi-simple and bi-simple case.
In practice, the system (a)&(b) often simpli…es. Part (a) or part (b) drops out if X contains no uni-or no bi-directional connection rules, respectively. If X is simple, semi-simple or bi-simple, (a)&(b) reduces to the conditions derived earlier (namely (1), (7) or (9), respectively). 20 Further, the system (a)&(b) may simplify once the concrete sets X p!q , p ! q 2 X, are inserted, possibly resulting in a simpler set of conditions that o¤ers an intuition for the size and structure of the space of possible threshold assignments. The next example demonstrate this.
Example. Consider the agenda in (13) . Which thresholds (m p ) p2X + guarantee consistency? By Theorem 2, three conditions must hold: one for a ! b (part (a)), one for a ! (b^c) (part (a)), and one for c $ a (part (b) ). The three conditions are: This is an example of how the presence of a bi -directional connection rule r in X can drastically narrow down the possibility space, especially relative to thresholds of r, of atomic propositions "in" r, and of connection rules logically related to r.
I now record two corollaries of Theorem 2. First, a possibility result follows. 21 Corollary 2 For an implication agenda X, there exists (i) a consistent quota rule F (mp) p2X + (hence a consistent, complete, independent, anonymous, monotonic and responsive aggregation rule with universal domain); 2 1 See Section 2 and footnote 11 for the conditions listed in part (i). By a di¤erent proof, part (i) holds more generally for any agenda X for which each p 2 X + is atomic or a connection rule (where, unlike for implication agendas, the atomic propositions in X + may di¤er from those contained in the connection rules in X + ).
(ii) a single consistent quota rule F (mp) p2X + with identical thresholds m p ; p 2 X + , namely the quota rule with a unanimity threshold m p = n for all p 2 X + .
Proof. As (ii) implies (i), I only show (ii). Let X be an implication agenda and F (mp) p2X + a quota rule with identical thresholds m p = m (2 f1; :::; ng). If m = n then (a)&(b) hold, implying consistency. Conversely, assume consistency. So (a)&(b) hold. X contains a p ! q or a p $ q (otherwise X would be empty, hence not an agenda). In the second case, m = n by (b). In the …rst case, the LHS inequality in (a) implies X a2C(p) (n m) + m m, whence again m = n.
So there is possibility -but how large is it? That is, how much freedom does Theorem 2 leave us in the choice of thresholds? As I now show, paths and cycles in X impose rather severe restrictions. Extending earlier de…nitions from simple to general implication agendas, consider the network over the atomic propositions in X, where an atomic proposition a 2 X a parent of another one b 2 X if there is a p ! q 2 X or a p $ q 2 X or a q $ p 2 X such that a 2 C(p) and b 2 C(q)nC(p). Parenthood yields the notion of an ancestor by transitive closure. A path is a sequence (a 1 ; :::; a k ) (k 2) where a j is a parent of a j+1 for all j < k; it is a cycle if a 1 = a k .
Corollary 3 Let F (mp) p2X + be a consistent quota rule for an implication agenda X. Proof. Let X and F (mp) p2X + be as speci…ed.
(i) Let a 2 X be a parent of b 2 X (obviously it su¢ ces to consider this case). Then a 2 C(p) and b 2 C(q)nC(p), where p ! q 2 X or p $ q 2 X or q $ p 2 X. An intuition for Theorem 2. Our earlier insights about simple, semi-simple and bi-simple implication agendas o¤er some clues to understand Theorem 2, more precisely to understand the necessity of (b) and of the LHS of (a). General implication agendas X go in three ways beyond simple ones: (i) implications p ! q 2 X may have non-atomic antecedent p; (ii) implications p ! q 2 X may have non-atomic consequent q; (iii) X may contain bi-implications p $ q.
Here, (i) reminds of semi-simple agendas. And indeed, the LHS of (a), for which (i) is responsible, is closely related to our earlier characterisation (7) of consistent quota rules for semi-simple agendas. To see why, suppose …rst that in (a) p ! q has atomic consequent q. Then the LHS of (a) coincides with the inequality in (7) . Now suppose q is non-atomic. Then p ! q is logically equivalent to the conjunction b2C(q)nC(p) p ! b, and the LHS of (a) is equivalent to applying the inequality in (7) to all implications p ! b; b 2 C(q)nC(p).
Further, (iii) reminds of bi-simple agendas. Part (b), for which (iii) is responsible, is indeed closely related to our characterisation (9) of consistent quota rules for bisimple agendas. If in (b) both p and q are atomic, (b) is equivalent to the condition in (9) . If p and/or q is non-atomic, (b) is the right generalisation of (9), as formally shown in the appendix.
Finally, (ii) is the aspect in which general implication agendas go substantially beyond both semi-and bi-simple ones. It is responsible for the (complex) RHS inequalities in (a). These inequalities are needed because (ii) introduces new types of inconsistency like fa ! b; a ! c; :(a ! (b^c))g.
An abstract characterisation result
A central issue so far was that each agenda X has its own types/sources of inconsistency Y X (e.g. the sets fa; a ! b; :bg X if X is a simple implication agenda). What exactly are "types/sources"of inconsistency? They are irreducible sets Y X, as made precise now. I introduce an abstract simplicity relation between inconsistent sets Y X, which allows one to simplify inconsistent sets, which yields irreducible sets. I do this in full generality, i.e. independently of implication agendas and the particular logic C + . This gives rise to an abstract characterisation result of which all above characterisations are applications. The notion of irreducible sets generalises a special irreducibility notion introduced by Dietrich and List [8] ; it also generalises minimal inconsistent sets (which are based on set-inclusion rather than a general simplicity relation), and for this reason the abstract characterisation result generalises the characterisation by the "intersection property" in Nehring and Puppe [18, 19] .
To avoid unnecessary restrictions to special judgment aggregation problems, we adopt Dietrich's [3] general logics framework in this section: let X L be an arbitrary agenda of propositions from any formal language L with well-behaved logical interconnections. 22 Further, let I be the set of all inconsistent sets Y X. Given the intended purpose, I will de…ne irreducibility in such a way that every inconsistent and complete set A X has an irreducible subset.
This property ensures that collective consistency holds if and only if no irreducible set is ever collectively accepted. Property (16) is the analogue of the property (10) underlying the 2-step procedure in earlier sections. Of course, we could achieve (16) by simply de…ning "irreducible" as "minimal inconsistent", since any inconsistent set A X has a minimal inconsistent subset. But this would often create a large number of irreducible sets (hence many redundant inequalities in step 2). The irreducibility notion I introduce depends on a parameter: the simplicity notion used. Under a certain (extreme) simplicity notion, "irreducible"will coincide with "minimal inconsistent"; other simplicity notions lead to fewer irreducible sets.
I now de…ne simplicity (from which I later de…ne irreducibility). Suppose we have a notion of simplicity of sets in I given by a binary relation < on I, where "Z < Y " 2 2 The well-behavedness can be expressed either in terms of the entailment notion (conditions L1-L3 in Dietrich [3] ) or in terms of the inconsistency notion (conditions I1-I3 in Dietrich [3] ) (assuming that both notions are interde…nable; see Section 2). Stated in terms of the consistency notion, the three conditions are: (I1) sets fp; :pg L are inconsistent; (I2) subsets of consistent sets are consistent; (I3) the empty set ; is consistent, and each consistent set A L has a consistent superset B L containing a member of each pair p; :p 2 L. If the agenda X is in…nite, I also assume the logic to be compact: every inconsistent set A L has a …nite inconsistent subset. All this holds for C + and most familiar logics, including propositional and predicate logics, classical and non-classical logics, with the important exception of non-monotonic logics.
is interpreted as "Z is simper than Y ". There is much freedom in how to specify < (the goal being to obtain "nice" irreducible sets, as explained later). For instance, we might de…ne < by Z < Y :, jZj < jY j (i.e. "simpler" means "smaller"), or by Z < Y :, Z ( nite Y (i.e. "simpler" means to be a proper …nite subset). I place only two restrictions on the simplicity notion:
Proper subsets are simpler: for all Y; Z 2 I, if Z ( nite Y then Z < Y . 23 No in…nite simpli…cation chains: < is well-founded, i.e. there is no in…nite sequence (Y k ) k=1;2;::: in I such that Y k+1 < Y k for all k = 1; 2; ::: 24 A simplicity relation is a binary relation < on I with these properties. For instance the two relations < just mentioned are simplicity relations.
Suppose we have chosen a simplicity relation <. Then (16) Of course, the new subset of A (Y 3 or Y 0 3 ) is not under all simplicity notions < simpler than Y 2 : for instance, we have Y 3 6 < Y 2 if < is the "smaller than"relation (i.e. Z < Y , jZj < jY j). There is however an obvious simplicity notion for which both Y 3 and Y 0 3 are simpler than Y 2 : they contain fewer connection rules than Y 2 (namely one instead of two). Indeed the application to implication agendas (in the appendix) will use a simplicity relation < that lexicographically prioritises minimising the number of (possibly negated) connection rules over minimising the number of (possibly negated) atomic propositions, thereby ensuring that Y 3 < Y 2 and Y 0 3 < Y 2 . The set Y 3 is obtained from Y 2 in a particular manner: I have taken in "new" propositions (namely b 1 ; :::; b 5 ) each of which is logically entailed by some set of "old" propositions, namely by V = fa; a ! (b 1^: ::^b 5 )g Y 2 . The fact that each "new" proposition b j is entailed by a V Y 2 has the important consequence that a simpli…cation of Y 2 into a subset of A is possible whether or not A contains all "new" propositions: if A does then Y 3 A, and if A does not contain the "new"proposition 2 3 Z ( nite Y stands for Z ( Y &jZj < 1. "( nite " can be replaced throughout by "(" if one assumes a …nite agenda. 2 4 < need not be connected, nor even transitive (if < also satis…es these conditions, < is a wellorder). Note that well-foundedness implies asymmetry (i.e. if Z < Y then Y Z), hence irre ‡exivity. Further, given asymmetry and transitivity, < is well-founded if and only if every set ; 6 = J I on which < is connected has a least element (i.e. a Z 2 J with Z < Y for all Y 2 J nfZg). The art is to use a simplicity relation < that allows su¢ ciently many (and the "right") simpli…cations so as to give few and elegant irreducible sets (hence a simple characterisation of collective consistency). Let me take up the two example above. It can be shown that if X is a simple implication agenda then the set IR < = MI consists of all sets Y X of type Y = fp; :pg or type Y = fa 1 ; a 1 ! a 2 ; :::; a k 1 ! a k ; :a k g (a 1 ; :::; a k pairwise distinct, k 2).
Example 2 (being simpler as being smaller). Let Z < Y :, jZj < jY j. Then reduction is equivalent to Dietrich and List's [8] special reduction notion (see footnote 25). If X is again a simple implication agenda, IR < is now much smaller than in Example 1: IR < can be shown to consist of all sets Y X of type fp; :pg, or of type (17) with k = 2 (i.e. of type fa; a ! b; :bg, like in Lemma 1). To see why sets of type (17) are not irreducible if k > 2, note that such a set Y is reducible for instance to Z := fa k 1 ; a k 1 ! a k ; :a k g, because jZj < jY j and a k 1 is entailed by V := fa 1 ; a 1 ! a 2 ; :::; a k 2 ! a k 1 g where jV [f:a k 1 gj < jY j. As a di¤erent agenda, consider a standard strict preference aggregation problem with a set of options K 6 = ;. This can be represented by the agenda X K := fxP y; :xP y : x; y 2 Kg in a suitable predicate logic with a binary predicate P for strict preference, a set of constants K for options, and a set of axioms containing the rationality conditions on strict linear orders, including for instance the transitivity axiom (8v 1 )(8v 2 )(8v 3 )((v 1 P v 2v 2 P v 3 ) ! v 1 P v 3 ) (see Dietrich and List [7] ; also List and Pettit [16] ). Dietrich and List [8] call a set Y X K a "k-cycle" (k 1) if it has the form Y = fx 1 P x 2 ; x 2 P x 3 ; :::; x k 1 P x k ; x k P x 1 g (x 1 ; :::; x k 2 K pairwise distinct), (18) or arises from such a set by replacing one or more of the members xP y by the logically equivalent proposition :yP x. They show that the irreducible sets are the k-cycles with k 3. To see why for k > 3 a k-cycle is not irreducible (though minimal inconsistent), note that a set Y of type (18) with k 4 is reducible to Z := fx 1 P x 2 ; x 2 P x 3 ; x 3 P x 1 g (a 3-cycle), because jZj < jY j and x 3 P x 1 is entailed by V := fx 3 P x 4 ; x 4 P x 5 ; :::; x k P x 1 g where jV [ f:x 3 P x 1 gj < jY j.
To understand the properties of reduction better, let me record two lemmas.
Lemma 3 Given any simplicity relation <, the reduction relation is itself a simplicity relation, that is:
(ii) there is no in…nite sequence (Y k ) k=1;2;::: in I such that Y k+1 is a reduction of Y k for all k = 1; 2; :::
Proof. Both parts follow immediately from the analogous properties of <.
Lemma 4 (i) For any simplicity relation <, IR < MI, and if < = ( nite then IR < = MI. (ii) For any simplicity relations < and < 0 , if < is a subrelation of < 0 then IR < 0 IR < .
Proof. (i) Let < be a simplicity relation. For all Y 2 I, if Y = 2 MI < then Y has an inconsistent proper subset Z, which we can choose …nite by compactness of the logic. By Lemma 3 Y is reducible to Z, whence Y = 2 IR < . (ii) If < and < 0 are simplicity relations and < is a subrelation of < 0 , then <-reduction is a subrelation of < 0 -reduction, and so IR < 0 IR < . Lemma 4 gives a general idea on how the set of irreducible sets IR < depends on the simplicity notion < used. The …ner < is, i.e. the more simpli…cations are allowed, the more reductions are allowed, and so the smaller IR < is (see part (ii)). The coarsest choice of < is ( nite ; then the only reductions are those to …nite proper subsets, and IR < is maximal: IR < = MI, whereas in general IR < MI (see part (i)).
I now prove the central property (16) announced earlier: every inconsistent and complete judgment set A X has an irreducible subset (reachable from A via …nitely many simpli…cations). 26 Proposition 1 Given any simplicity relation <, every inconsistent and complete set A X has a subset in IR < .
So, by Example 2 above, if X is a simple implication agenda then any inconsistent and complete set A X has a subset of type fp; :pg or fa; a ! b; :bg (as also shown in Lemma 1); and if X is instead the preference agenda X K , A has a subset that is a k-cycle with k 3 -a well-known result of social choice theory since A corresponds to a connected strict preference relation on K with rationality violation. By Proposition 1, a quota rule F (mp) p2X + is consistent if and only if it never accepts any Y 2 IR < . The following lemma tells which inequality we must impose to achieve this. Conversely, suppose that F has an outcome F (A 1 ; :::
(n n p ).
As no
Proposition 1 and Lemma 5 imply the desired characterisation result.
Theorem 3 For any simplicity relation <, a quota rule F (mp) p2X + is consistent if and only if X p2Y (n m p ) < n for all Y 2 IR < (where m :p := n m p + 1 8p 2 X + ).
Theorem 3 generalises the anonymous case of the "intersection property" result in Nehring and Puppe [18, 19] . This result makes no reference to a simplicity relation and uses MI instead of IR < . Hence it follows from Theorem 3 by choosing < such that IR < = MI, i.e. by choosing < as the coarsest simplicity relation ( nite . A non-anonymous variant of Theorem 3 can be derived similarly, generalising the nonanonymous intersection property result. 27 One might wonder whether one could also generalise the (anonymous or non-anonymous) intersection property result in Dietrich and List [6] which requires no collective completeness 28 , again by using irreducible sets instead of minimal inconsistent sets. No straightforward generalisation works, since the completeness assumption is essential in Proposition 1.
In general, the …ner the simplicity relation < is chosen, the smaller IR < becomes, and hence the "slimmer" Theorem 3's characterisation becomes since redundant inequalities are avoided. The question of how much smaller than MI the set IR < can get (and hence how much "slimmer" than the intersection property result Theorem 3's characterisation can get) depends on the concrete agenda X. In Example 2 above, IR < gets signi…cantly smaller than MI. Note …nally that if the inequalities have no solution, the agenda has no consistent quota rule. This is often so for agendas in classical logic, since here the judgments on atomic propositions fully settle the judgments on compound propositions.
While theoretically elegant, Theorem 3's system of inequalities is abstract. Checking whether it holds requires to know which sets are irreducible. The latter question can even be non-decidable in the technical sense: in some logics (such as standard predicate logic), it is non-decidable whether a set of propositions is inconsistent; so derived notions like irreducibility or minimal inconsistency may also be non-decidable.
In view of applications, two corollaries are useful. Call an inconsistent set trivial if it contains a pair p; :p or contains a contradiction p (like a^:a). Any trivial Y 2 IR < has by minimal inconsistency the form Y = fp; :pg or Y = fpg. So for trivial Y 2 IR < the inequality X p2Y (n m p ) < n holds automatically, whatever the thresholds (m p ) p2X + 2 f1; :::; ng X + . Removing these redundant inequalities, we obtain a slightly slimmer characterisation:
Corollary 4 Theorem 3 still holds if IR < is replaced by IR < := fY 2 IR < : Y is non-trivialg:
As an illustration, consider a simple implication agenda X. By Theorem 1, F (mp) p2X + is consistent if and only if
This characterisation is equivalent to that of Corollary 4 if < is de…ned by Z < Y :, jZj < jY j: indeed, IR < = ffa; a ! b; :bg : a ! b 2 Xg by Example 2 above, so that 2 7 If we endow each p 2 X + not with a threshold mp 2 f1; :::; ng but, more generally, with a set Cp of ("winning") coalitions C N such that ; = 2 Cp, N 2 Cp, and [C 2 Cp&C C N ] ) C 2 Cp, we can de…ne an aggregation rule F (Cp) p2X + with universal domain by F (Cp) p2X + (A1; :::; An) = fp 2 X : fi 2 N : p 2 Aig 2 Cpg (where C:p := fC N : N nC = 2 Cpg for all p 2 X + ). Such a rule F (Cp) p2X + is called a committee rule. The quota rules F (mp) p2X + are precisely the anonymous committee rules (where each p 2 X + has set of winning coalitions Cp = fC N : jCj mpg). The analogue of Theorem 3 is: for any simplicty relation <, a committee rule F (Cp) p2X + is consistent if and only if \p2Y Cp 6 = ; for all Y 2 IR< and all winning coalitions Cp 2 Cp, p 2 Y . This becomes the non-anonymous intersection property result if IR< = MI, i.e. if we choose < := nite . 2 8 More precisely, it does not require for propositions p 2 X that m:p = n mp + 1 (or, in the non-anonymous case discussed in footnote 27, that the coalitions winning for :p be the coalitions whose complements are not winning for p). (n m p ) < n; Y 2 IR < , are equivalent to the inequalities (19) . If < is alternatively de…ned as ( nite , then by Example 1 above IR < consists of all sets of type (17); thus IR < is now much larger, and the resulting characterisation of Corollary 4 contains redundant inequalities.
Determining the set IR < (or IR < ) is often hard, e.g. for general implication agendas. Determining a superset of it can be simpler -and it su¢ ces by the next corollary, obtained by combining Corollary 4 with Theorem 3, the latter applied with < = ( nite , i.e. with IR < = MI. So, to …nd out for a concrete agenda which quota rules are consistent, it su¢ ces to de…ne a suitable simplicity relation < and determine some set Y with IR < Y MI. Precisely this is done for implication agendas in the appendix.
Conclusion
Connection rules, of the uni-directional kind p ! q or bi-directional kind p $ q, are at the heart of judgment aggregation. They express links that may be accepted or rejected, for instance causal links between facts or justi…cational links between claims. Once we interpret these (bi-)implications subjunctively, we can generate consistent and complete collective judgment sets by taking independent and anonymous votes on the propositions, provided that we use appropriate acceptance thresholds (see Theorems 1 and 2 and Table 2 ). This possibility result holds for judgment aggregation problems on so-called implication agendas.
The results on implication agendas are applications of an abstract result, Theorem 3, which applies to arbitrary agendas in a general logic: it characterises consistent aggregation in terms of so-called irreducible sets (which generalise minimal inconsistent sets 29 ). It would be interesting to apply this result to classes of agendas other than implication agendas, in order to gain new insights on (im)possibilities of propositionwise voting. However, at least as important as this would be to develop a systematic understanding of non-propositionwise judgment aggregation rules. Though often mentioned, this route is largely unexplored.
References
A Proof of Theorem 2 from Theorem 3
We consider an arbitrary implication agenda X ( L). The language L (de…ned in Section 2) is endowed with the non-classical notions of entailment and (in)consistency de…ned in Section 3 (using C + -interpretations). Recall that A ( L) is the set of atomic propositions. Denote the set of all connection rules by R (= fa ! b; (ab ) $ c; :::g). For all S L let S : := f:p : p 2 Sg and S := S [ S : . We wish to apply Theorem 3 to X -but with which simplicity relation <? De…ning < as ( nite gives a very complicated set IR < = MI (containing for instance sets like Y = fa; a ! b; a 0 ; a 0 ! b 0 ; (b^b 0 ) ! (a^c); :cg). Even the …ner simplicity relation given by Z < Y :, jZj < jY j, while suitable for simple implication agendas (see the end of Section 7), is inappropriate in general since, as indicated in Section 7, we would like to simplify sets like fa; a ! (b 1^b2^b3 ); (b 1^b2^b3 ) ! c; :cg into fb 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 ; (b 1^b2^b3 ) ! c; :cg on the grounds that the latter set contains fewer connection rules despite of having more elements overall. The following lexicographic simplicity notion allows us to perform such simpli…cations and to get a grip on IR < . For all inconsistent sets Z; Y X, Z < Y :, (jZ \ Rj; jZ \ Aj) is lexicographically smaller than (jY \ Rj; jY \ Aj),
i.e. jZ \ Rj < jY \ Rj or jZ \ Rj = jY \ Rj&jZ \ Aj < jZ \ Aj. For instance, fa; :bg < fa ! bg as (0; 2) is lexicographically smaller than (1; 0). The following is easily shown (using that the "lexicographically smaller than" relation is well-founded).
Lemma 6
The above relation < is a simplicity relation. 30 To identify the <-irreducible sets, we …rst need to understand better which entailments and inconsistencies hold within implication agendas; hence the next two technical lemmas. Generalising Section 6's notation "X p ", I put, for all p 2 L and all R L, R p := fs 2 L : p ! s 2 R or p $ s 2 R or s $ p 2 Rg, the set of propositions "reachable"from p via (bi-)implications in R. I …rst establish a plausible fact about entailments between connection rules: namely, for instance, that R = fp ! b; p ! (c^d)g p ! (b^c) because each conjunct of b^c (i.e. b and c) is a conjunct of some s 2 R p = fb; c^dg.
Lemma 7 For all R R and p ! q 2 R,
Note that this characterisation of R p ! q implies one of R p $ q (for R R and p $ q 2 R), since R p $ q if and only if R p ! q and R q ! p.
Proof. Let R R and p ! q 2 R.
First let C(q)nC(p)
[ s2Rp C(s). Suppose all r 2 R hold in world w of interpretation (W; (f r ); (v w )). We have to show that p ! q holds in w, i.e. that all a 2 C(q) hold in all w 2 f p (w). Let a 2 C(q) and w 2 f p (w). By assumption, a 2 C(p) or a 2 C(s) for some s 2 R p . In the …rst case, a holds in w as p does (by w 2 f p (w)). In the second case, a holds in w as s does (by v w (p ! s) = T and w 2 f p (w)).
2. Conversely, suppose that a 2 C(q)nC(p) but a = 2 [ s2Rp C(s). To show R 2 p ! q, consider an interpretation (W; (f p ); (v w )) such that: (i) W contains at least two distinct worlds w; w ; (ii) all atomic propositions hold in w, (iii) all atomic propositions except a hold in w , (iv) f p (w) = fw; w g (which is allowed as p holds in w and w ), and (v) for all t 2 Lnfpg f t (w) fwg. To complete the proof, I show that all r 2 R hold in w but p ! q doesn't. First, v w (p ! q) = F by (iv) and as v w (q) = F by (iii). To show the truth in w of all r 2 R, I show that of every implication t ! s with t ! s 2 R or t $ s 2 R or s $ t 2 R. For such t ! s, if t 6 = p then v w (t ! s) = T by (v) and (ii); and if t = p then v w (t ! s) = T by (iv) and (ii)-(iii) and using that a = 2 C(s).
The next technical lemma shows that there are broadly two ways in which a subset A of the implication agenda X can be inconsistent (the second way, (20) , holds for instance if :(a ! (b^c)); a ! b; a ! c 2 A.). ( ) there is a p!q 2 C(q)nC(p) with a p!q = 2 C(q 0 ) for all q 0 2 A p , as otherwise C(q)nC(p) [ q 0 2Ap C(q 0 ), whence by Lemma 7 A \ R p ! q (take R := A \ R and note that R p = A p ), implying (20) . Further, for all :(p $ q) 2 A, either ( 1) there is a 1 p$q 2 C(q)nC(p) with a 1 p$q = 2 C(q 0 ) for all q 0 2 A p or ( 2) there is a 2 p$q 2 C(p)nC(q) with a 2 p$q = 2 C(p 0 ) for all p 0 2 A q , as otherwise C(q)nC(p) [ q 0 2Ap C(q 0 ) and C(p)jC(q) [ p 0 2Aq , whence again by Lemma 7 A \ R p ! q and A \ R p ! r, i.e. A \ R p $ q, implying (20) .
To prove A's consistency, I construct an interpretation and show that in a world all r 2 A hold. Notationally, for any r 2 R let r mat be r's material counterpart: (p ! q) mat is :p _ q, and (p $ q) mat is (p ! q) mat^( q ! p) mat . Let A mat be the set arising from A by replacing all r 2 A \ R by r mat . Since A is consistent and r j= r mat for all r 2 R, A mat is also consistent. So there exists an interpretation (W; (f p ); (v w )) and a world w such that (w1) all members of A mat are true in w.
As the propositions in A mat contain no subjunctive (bi-)implications, their truth values in w depend neither on other worlds nor on the functions f p ; p 2 L. So we may assume the following w.l.o.g.
(w2) For all :(p ! q) 2 A, there is a world w p!q 2 W nfwg in which all atomic proposition except a p!q hold; and w p!q 2 f p (w) but w p$q = 2 f s (w) 8s 2 Lnfpg.
(w3) For all :(p $ q) 2 A with ( 1), there is a world w 1 p$q 2 W nfwg in which all atomic propositions except a 1 p$q hold; and w 1 p$q 2 f p (w) but w 1 p$q = 2 f s (w) 8s 2 Lnfpg.
(w4) For all :(p $ q) 2 A with ( 2), there is a world w 2 p$q 2 W nfwg in which all atomic propositions except a 2 p$q hold; and w 2 p$q 2 f q (w) but w 2 p$q = 2 f s (w) 8s 2 Lnfqg.
(w5) Worlds w 0 2 W other than those de…ned in (w1)-(w4) are not reachable from w: w 0 = 2 f r (w) 8r 2 L. To complete the proof, I consider any r 2 A and show that r holds in w. Case 1 : r is atomic or negated atomic. Then r 2 A mat . So r holds in w by (w1). Case 2 : r is an implication s ! t. Let w 0 2 f s (w). I have to show that t holds in w 0 . If w 0 = w, s holds in w by w 2 f s (w); so, as (s ! t) mat = :s _ t holds in w by (w1), t holds in w. Now let w 0 6 = w. Then by (w5), w 0 is one of the worlds de…ned in (w2)-(w4). Assume w 0 = w p!q , a world de…ned in (w2) (proofs for (w3) and (w4) are similar). By w p!q 2 f s (w) and (w2), p = s. By (w2), all atomic propositions except a p!q hold in w p!q , where a p!q isn't a conjunct of t by ( ). So t holds in w p!q = w 0 .
Case 3 : r is a bi-implication s $ t. s $ t holds in w if s ! t and t ! s are true in w. The latter can be shown by a procedure analogous to that in case 2.
Case 4 : r is a negated implication :(p ! q). To show that r holds in w, I show that p ! q fails in w. This is so because, by (w2), w p!q 2 f p (w) where q fails in w p!q as its conjunct a p!q fails.
Case 5 : r is a negated bi-implication :(p $ q). To show that r holds in w, I show that p $ q is false in w, i.e. that p ! q or q ! p is false in w. Under ( 1) p ! q is false in w (consider the world w 1 p$q and use (w3)), and under ( 2) q ! p is false in w (consider the world w 2 p$q and use (w4)). : s 2 Sg [ fq s : s 2 S 0 g where S 2 X p!q , 8s 2 S p s 2 fp ! s; p $ s; s $ pg, S 0 2 X q!p , 8s 2 S 0 q s 2 fq ! s; q $ s; s $ qg, and the sets fp s : s 2 Sg, fq s : s 2 S 0 g are either each disjoint with fp $ q; q $ pg or each equal to fq $ pg (the latter is only possible if S = fqg&S 0 = fpg; the former holds automatically if S 6 = fqg&S 0 6 = fpg as then q = 2 S&p = 2 S 0 ).
(The set X p!q in the last two bullet points was de…ned in Section 6.) 
